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ABSTRACT
Although the 1996 welfare reform legislation limited the eligibility of immigrant households to
receive assistance, many states chose to protect their immigrant populations by offering state-funded
aid to these groups. I exploit these changes in eligibility rules to examine the link between the
welfare cutbacks and health insurance coverage in the immigrant population. The data reveal that
the cutbacks in the Medicaid program did not reduce health insurance coverage rates among targeted
immigrants. The immigrants responded by increasing their labor supply, thereby raising the
probability of being covered by employer-sponsored health insurance.
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I. Introduction 
The number of immigrants entering the United States grew rapidly in recent decades. 
During the 1950s, only 250,000 legal immigrants entered the country annually. By the 1990s, 
nearly 1 million persons entered the country legally each year and another 300,000 entered—and 
stayed in—the country illegally.1 An increasing number of the new immigrants fall in the lower 
range of the skill and income distributions. In 1960, the typical immigrant earned 4 percent more 
than the average native worker. By 1998, the typical immigrant earned 23 percent less (Borjas, 
1999, p. 21). 
The trends in the size and skill composition of the immigrant population sparked a 
contentious debate over the economic and demographic impact of immigration.2 For instance, 
there has been a great deal of concern over the possibility that immigrants do not “pay their way” 
in the welfare state (Smith and Edmonston, 1998, Chapters 6 and 7). And, in fact, the evidence 
suggests that immigrant households are now much more likely to receive public assistance than 
in the past.3 
                                                 
* Robert W. Scrivner Professor of Economics and Social Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University; and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. I am grateful to Susan 
Dynarski, Paul Gertler, Jonathan Gruber, and Stephen Trejo for very useful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. This research was funded by a grant from the Economic Research Initiative on the Uninsured at the 
University of Michigan. 
1 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2000, pp. 18, 271. 
2 The voluminous literature on the economic impacts of immigration is surveyed in Borjas (1994), 
LaLonde and Topel (1996), and Friedberg and Hunt (1995). 
3 Blau (1984) and Borjas and Hilton (1996) examine the trends and determinants of immigrant welfare use.   3
Concurrent with the resurgence of large-scale immigration, there has been an increase in 
the number of persons who lack health insurance coverage.4 Recent research suggests there may 
be an important link between these two trends. Despite the relatively high participation rate of 
immigrants in the Medicaid program, Camarota and Edwards (2000) report that immigrants are 
also disproportionately more likely to be in the population of uninsured persons: although 
persons in immigrant households make up only 13 percent of the population, they make up 26 
percent of the uninsured. Camarota and Edwards conclude that “immigrants who arrived 
between 1994 and 1998 accounted for 59 percent of the growth in the size of the uninsured 
population” during that period (p. 5). 
The 1994-1998 period coincided with the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The 1996 welfare reform legislation 
specified a new set of rules for determining the eligibility of foreign-born persons to receive 
practically all types of federal aid. In rough terms, PRWORA denies most means-tested 
assistance to non-citizens who arrived after the legislation was signed in 1996, and limited the 
eligibility of many non-citizens already living in the United States. The available evidence 
indicates that the rate of welfare participation in immigrant households declined sharply—
relative to the decline in native households—in the aftermath of PRWORA (Borjas, 2001, Fix 
and Passel, 1999). 
This paper uses data drawn from the 1995-2001 Current Population Surveys to examine 
the impact of PRWORA on health insurance coverage among immigrants. Because PRWORA 
reduced immigrant participation in welfare programs (including Medicaid), it seems reasonable 
to suspect that the welfare cutbacks should have increased the size of the foreign-born uninsured 
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population. Remarkably, this expected increase did not occur. In fact, the fraction of immigrants 
who were not covered by health insurance remained roughly stable (or fell) during the period.  
The immigrant provisions in PRWORA could potentially affect only a subset of the 
immigrant population, depending on the immigrant’s state of residence, on the type of visa used 
to enter the United States, and on the immigrant’s naturalization status. This variation in 
eligibility rules can be exploited to examine how immigrants responded to the cutbacks in public 
assistance. It turns out that the immigrants most adversely affected by PRWORA significantly 
increased their labor supply, thereby raising the probability that they were covered by employer-
sponsored health insurance. In fact, the evidence indicates that the increase in the number of 
immigrants covered by employer-sponsored health insurance was large enough to completely 
offset the impact of the Medicaid cutbacks. The study, therefore, provides evidence of a strong 
crowdout effect of publicly provided health insurance among immigrants.5 
It is important to note, however, that my results differ in an important way from the 
evidence typically reported in the crowdout literature. The welfare reform legislation affected 
immigrant participation in a vast array of public assistance programs, not just Medicaid. For 
example, PRWORA also restricted immigrant receipt of cash benefits and food stamps. The 
crowdout effects documented in this paper, therefore, measure the total immigrant response to a 
generalized cutback in public assistance, rather than the immigrant response to eligibility 
changes in the Medicaid program. 
 
                                                 
5 Cutler and Gruber (1996) present the first empirical evidence of how publicly provided health insurance 
can crowd out private insurance. Although some studies in the subsequent literature confirm the Cutler-Gruber 
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document large crowdout effects, while Blumberg et al (2000), Dubay and Kenney (1997), Ham and Shore-
Sheppard (2001), and Yazici and Kaestner (1998) find much smaller effects. It is worth noting that the existing 
evidence is drawn entirely from the behavioral response to expansions in the Medicaid program. Gruber (in press) 
surveys the literature.   5
II. Welfare Reform and Health Insurance: Aggregate Trends 
The welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996 made fundamental changes in the federal 
system of public assistance. The overriding objective of the legislation was to move welfare 
recipients into work. In addition to granting state governments a great deal of authority to set 
their own eligibility rules and benefit levels, the legislation mandates that most welfare recipients 
go to work after two years and imposes a five-year lifetime limit for receiving assistance. In 
addition to these universal changes in coverage and eligibility, PRWORA includes a number of 
provisions that specifically limit the extent to which immigrant households can receive public 
assistance. As signed by President Clinton, PRWORA contained three key provisions applying to 
legal immigrants who did not enter the country as refugees: 
1.  Most non-citizens who arrived in the country before August 22, 1996, the “pre-
enactment” immigrants, were to be kicked off from the SSI, food stamp, and 
Medicaid rolls within a year. This provision of the legislation, however, was never 
fully enforced. 
2.  Non-citizens who entered the United States after August 22, 1996, the “post-
enactment” immigrants, are prohibited from receiving most types of public assistance, 
including Medicaid, during the first five years after arrival. 
3.  Post-enactment immigrants are subject to stricter “deeming” regulations: The income 
and assets of the immigrant’s sponsor will be deemed to be part of the immigrant’s 
application for most types of public assistance for up to ten years.6 
In contrast to these restrictions on the (legal) non-refugee, non-citizen population, the legislation 
did not restrict refugee participation in the various public assistance programs. In addition, the 
legislation continued to prohibit illegal immigrants from receiving most types of aid.   6
  As noted above, the restrictions on welfare use by pre-enactment immigrants were never 
fully enforced. In particular, the balanced budget agreement reached in 1997 between President 
Clinton and the Republican-controlled Congress (combined with state actions discussed below) 
effectively repealed some of the most draconian aspects of the legislation.7 As a result, few of the 
pre-enactment immigrants were actually kicked off the welfare rolls. Moreover, only a relatively 
small fraction of the immigrant population in the United States arrived after 1996, so that few 
immigrants are actually barred from receiving assistance. It would seem, therefore, that 
PRWORA could not have had a large impact on welfare participation rates in the immigrant 
population—after all, relatively few immigrants could have been directly affected by the 
legislation. 
A number of studies, however, report that the welfare reform legislation seems to have 
had an important influence on immigrant participation in welfare programs (Fix and Passel, 
1999; Borjas, 2001). In particular, welfare participation rates declined after 1996 for both 
immigrant and native households, but the decline was much steeper among immigrants. This 
finding led an Urban Institute study to conclude that “because comparatively few legal 
immigrants were ineligible for public benefits as of December 1997, it appears that the steeper 
declines in non-citizens’ than citizens’ use of welfare…owe more to the ‘chilling effect’ of 
welfare reform and other policy changes than they do to actual eligibility changes” (Fix and 
Passel, 1999, p. 8; emphasis added). 
It is instructive to illustrate the nature of these trends. The Annual Demographic Files of 
the Current Population Surveys (CPS) provide detailed information on participation in various 
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social assistance programs and on health insurance coverage during the calendar year prior to the 
survey. I use the 1995-2001 March Supplements, which provide program participation data for 
the 1994-2000 calendar years, in the empirical analysis reported below.8 Throughout the paper, 
the person is the unit of analysis. I restrict the study to persons who do not reside in group 
quarters and who are under 65 years of age. 
The first step in the analysis is to define the sample of foreign-born persons. A simple 
(though obviously incorrect) solution in the current context would be to classify the person based 
solely on his or her birthplace. This approach has the serious problem that children born in the 
United States to foreign-born parents would be classified as native-born, even though their 
immigrant parents are making the employment and welfare participation decisions that inevitably 
determine their health insurance coverage. To simplify the presentation of the evidence, I 
classify all persons in the household as foreign-born or native-born based solely on the birthplace 
of the household head. Similarly, all foreign-born persons in the household will be classified as 
citizen or non-citizen based on the naturalization status of the household head.9 Throughout the 
paper, I will use this algorithm to assign all persons into one of three mutually exclusive groups: 
native-born, naturalized citizen, and non-citizen.  
Table 1 summarizes some of the key trends in health insurance coverage for the 1994-
2000 period. As shown in earlier research, the decline in welfare use during this period was 
steeper among immigrants. For example, the fraction of natives enrolled in the Medicaid 
program fell from 11.8 to 9.9 percent between 1994 and 2000. In contrast, the fraction of 
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“official” person weights provided in this survey do not yield an accurate enumeration of the immigrant population 
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immigrants enrolled in Medicaid declined by 3.6 percentage points over the same period (from 
17.0 to 13.4 percent). Moreover, the decline was limited to non-citizens—precisely the group of 
foreign-born persons targeted by welfare reform. Their participation rate fell by 5.5 percentage 
points (from 21.3 to 15.8 percent). The evidence, therefore, suggests that welfare reform—at 
least at the national level—may have had a sizable chilling effect on immigrant participation in 
the Medicaid program.10 
Remarkably, this relative decline in Medicaid use in the immigrant population was not 
accompanied by a concurrent decline in the fraction of immigrants who have some type of health 
insurance coverage. In fact, the proportion of immigrants who have some type of coverage rose 
slightly over the period, from 67.0 percent in 1994 to 68.8 percent in 2000. This trend is almost 
identical to the 1.9 percentage point increase in the health insurance coverage rate of natives, 
where the coverage rate rose from 85.1 to 87.0 percent.  Finally, although the trends are noisier, 
the coverage rate was essentially stable for naturalized citizens, and rose slightly for non-
citizens. 
The concurrent decline in Medicaid coverage and the relative stability of health insurance 
coverage in the immigrant population suggests that immigrants must have switched to other 
sources of coverage. The bottom panel of Table 1 reveals the source of the alternative coverage: 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). The fraction of natives with ESI rose by 4.3 percentage 
points, from 66.9 to 71.2 percent over the period. In contrast, the fraction of immigrants with ESI 
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the birthplace and citizenship of both the household head and his or her spouse. 
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legislation. In particular, there was a substantial drop in Medicaid coverage among immigrants between 1995 and 
1996. Because the welfare reform provisions regarding immigrants went into effect on August 22, 1996, the change 
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rose by 5.8 percentage points, from 45.8 to 51.6 percent. Finally, the fraction of non-citizens 
with ESI rose by 6.3 percentage points, from 37.3 to 43.6 percent. In short, the aggregate time 
series suggests that immigrant displacement from the Medicaid rolls seems to have been 
completely offset by a corresponding increase in the number of immigrants who received health 
insurance coverage through their employer. 
These aggregate trends, though suggestive, do not conclusively prove that Medicaid 
crowds out privately provided health insurance coverage in the immigrant population. After all, 
the economy was booming between 1994 and 2000, and the health insurance coverage trends 
may be capturing this macroeconomic effect rather than any behavioral response on the part of 
immigrants. I will show below, however, that these nationwide trends confound systematic 
differences within the immigrant population, mainly because they ignore the fact that different 
states responded differently to the federal restrictions on immigrant welfare use. The various 
state responses help to identify the extent to which Medicaid crowds out employer-sponsored 
insurance. 
 
III. State Responses to Welfare Reform 
A key provision of PRWORA allows states to enact state-funded assistance programs 
specifically targeted to their immigrant populations if they wished to attenuate the presumed 
adverse impact of welfare reform on the foreign-born. Zimmermann and Tumlin (1999) and 
Tumlin, Zimmermann and Ost (1999) summarize the various programs that states extended to 
immigrants in the wake of welfare reform. Although there are many ways of describing the 
states’ choices, one simple approach indicates if the states offered TANF, Medicaid, food 
assistance, and SSI to pre-enactment and post-enactment immigrants during the initial five-year 
bar. It turns out that almost every jurisdiction (50 out of 51) offered TANF and Medicaid to pre-  10
enactment immigrants. A few states went beyond this “minimal” level of generosity and offered 
other programs to their pre-enactment immigrant populations and to post-enactment immigrants 
during the five-year bar. The first two columns of Table 2 summarize these “beyond-the-
minimum” state actions. It is worth noting that many of the states with large concentrations of 
immigrants exceeded the minimal level of generosity. 
  To show how the “chilling effect” of welfare reform on Medicaid participation and health 
insurance coverage depended on the decisions made by individual states, I pool the 1994-95 
calendar years of the March CPS to provide a snapshot of the immigrant and native population 
prior to welfare reform, and the 1998-2000 calendar years to provide the respective snapshot 
after welfare reform.11 To easily summarize the evidence, I group states into two categories that 
signal their degree of generosity towards immigrants. I initially use a definition of the state’s 
generosity based on the data summarized in the first two columns of Table 2. A state is classified 
as “more generous” if it offered at least one of the programs listed in these two columns; 
otherwise, the state is classified as “less generous”. By this definition, 29 states are classified as 
more generous. Finally, I calculate health insurance coverage rates in three mutually exclusive 
groups: natives, citizens, and non-citizens.12 
The first four columns of Table 3 summarize the evidence. The table clearly shows that 
the decisions made by some states to offer a state-funded safety net to their immigrant 
populations did not greatly alter the trend of Medicaid participation for native households. For 
example, the probability that natives are enrolled in Medicaid declined by about 2 to 3 
                                                 
11 Note that I do not use data from the 1996 and 1997 calendar years in the calculations. This helps to 
isolate the break in the time series that can presumably be attributed to PRWORA.  
12 The sample sizes for the four groups are as follows. In the 1994-1995 pooled sample, there are 210,994 
natives, 11,088 citizens, and 24,107 non-citizens. In the 1998-2000 pooled sample, there are 290,579 natives, 21,411 
citizens, and 35,599 non-citizens.   11
percentage points during the period, regardless of whether the state was generous to its 
immigrant population. In contrast, the state decisions had a greater impact on Medicaid 
enrollment rates among immigrants, both for naturalized citizens and non-citizens. For example, 
the fraction of citizens enrolled in Medicaid declined by 1.5 percentage points in the less-
generous states, but rose in the more generous states. Similarly, the fraction of non-citizens 
enrolled in Medicaid declined by 7.0 percentage points (from 18.1 to 11.1 percent) in the less 
generous states, but by 4.9 percentage points in the more generous states (from 21.0 to 16.1 
percent). It is clear that non-citizen households in the less generous states experienced a much 
larger relative decline in Medicaid participation than native households. 
The differential trends for non-citizen households between the less generous and more 
generous states are even sharper when the sample is restricted to the non-refugee population. 
Although the CPS data do not report the type of visa used by a particular immigrant to enter the 
country, one can approximate the refugee sample by using information on the national origin of 
the foreign-born households. In particular, most refugees tend to originate in a small set of 
countries.13 I classified all persons residing in households where the household head originated in 
the main refugee-sending countries as refugees, while all other persons were classified as non-
refugees. The non-citizen, non-refugees residing in the less generous states experienced a 7.0 
percentage point decline in their Medicaid participation rate, as compared to the 3.1 percentage 
point decline for the non-citizen, non-refugees residing in the more generous states. 
The second panel of Table 3 replicates the analysis for health insurance coverage. The 
probability that natives are covered by health insurance rose slightly in both the more and less 
generous states. Moreover, the probability that immigrants are covered by health insurance is 
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Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary, Laos, Poland, Romania, Thailand, the former U.S.S.R., and Vietnam.   12
also relatively stable over time: the probability fell by 0.3 percentage points in the more generous 
states and by 1.1 percentage points in the less generous states. Most strikingly, the health 
insurance coverage rate for non-citizens dropped by 1.7 percentage points in the more generous 
states, but rose by 2.1 percentage points in the less generous states. In short, the descriptive data 
reported in Table 3 do not reveal that the Medicaid cutbacks experienced by non-citizens in the 
less generous states adversely affected their overall rate of health insurance coverage. 
The differential trends in non-citizen Medicaid participation and health insurance 
coverage can be explained by a substantial increase in the probability that these immigrants were 
covered by ESI. The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the trends in the rate of employer-provided 
insurance for the various groups. The generosity of the state’s welfare program towards 
immigrants does not affect the likelihood that natives are covered by ESI. The rate of employer-
sponsored insurance among natives rose by 2.6 percentage points in the more generous states, 
and by 3.0 percentage points in the less generous states. In contrast, the rate of ESI coverage for 
non-citizens rose by 2.7 percentage points in the more generous states, and by an astounding 11.4 
percentage points in the less generous states. The descriptive evidence reported in Table 3, 
therefore, suggests a causal relationship between the Medicaid cutbacks and the use of ESI 
coverage in the targeted population. 
The last four columns of the table report the trends in health insurance coverage in a 
population that is of particular concern in the current context, namely children under the age of 
15.14 The differences in the trends among the various types of health insurance coverage tend to 
be much sharper among children than in the general population. For example, the fraction of 
non-citizen children covered by Medicaid fell by 4.5 percentage points in the more generous 
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states (from 35.4 to 30.9 percent), but it dropped by almost 9 percentage points in the less 
generous states (from 31.1 to 22.2 percent). 
Interestingly, the substantial decline in government-sponsored health insurance among 
non-citizen children living in the less generous states did not materially affect the fraction of 
those children who had some type of health insurance coverage. In particular, the rate of health 
insurance coverage for non-citizen children in the more generous states fell by 1.3 percentage 
points (from 70.1 to 68.8 percent), but rose by 2.4 percentage points (from 63.3 to 65.7 percent) 
in the less generous states. The underlying reason for this differential trend was again a sizable 
increase in the number of non-citizen children covered by employer-sponsored insurance. The 
rate of ESI coverage for non-citizen children living in the more generous states rose from 35.5 to 
37.1 percent during the period, as contrasted with a rise from 32.6 percent to 44.9 percent for the 
children living in the less generous states. In short, the labor supply responses by the parents of 
non-citizen children helped to completely offset the impact of the government cutbacks in 
Medicaid assistance. 
It is instructive to use a simple regression model to formalize and extend these descriptive 
results. By controlling for various socioeconomic characteristics, the regression approach helps 
us determine if the differential trends in health insurance coverage observed between the more 
and less generous states arise because different types of immigrants tend to live in different 
states, or if the variation can be attributed to state-specific trends in economic activity or social 
conditions. To illustrate the basic methodology, pool the CPS data available for the calendar 
years 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, and 2000 and consider the triple-difference linear probability 
specification: 
 
(1)   yij = Xij β + α0 tij + α1 Iij + α2 Gj    14
     + γ0 (Iij × tij) + γ1 (Iij × Gj) + γ2 (Gj × tij) + θ (Iij × Gj × tij) + εij , 
 
where yij is a dummy variable indicating a particular type of health insurance outcome for person 
i in state j (such as enrollment in Medicaid); Xij is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics 
defined below; tij is a dummy variable set to unity if the observation refers to the post-PRWORA 
period (i.e., calendar years 1998 through 2000); Iij is a vector of two dummy variables indicating 
if the person is a naturalized citizen or a non-citizen (the left-out variable indicates if the person 
is native-born); and Gj is the dummy variable indicating the state’s generosity towards 
immigrants, set to unity if the state did not go beyond the minimum level of assistance offered to 
pre-enactment or post-enactment immigrants during the five-year bar. Specifically, Gj is set to 
unity if the state did not offer any of the programs listed in the first two columns of Table 2. 
Finally, the standard errors are clustered by state-immigration cells to adjust for possible serial 
correlation in insurance outcomes at the state level for each of the three immigration status 
groups. 
For simplicity, the regression specification in (1) uses a three-way classification of the 
immigration status of the population (i.e., natives, naturalized citizens, and non-citizens). I 
account for the immigrant’s refugee status as well as year of entry into the United States by 
including these characteristics as regressors in the vector X. The other socioeconomic 
characteristics in this vector include: the person’s age, gender, race, and educational attainment, 
the number of persons in the household, and the number of children, elderly persons, and 
disabled persons in the household.15 The regression also includes the state’s unemployment rate 
                                                 
15 Throughout the analysis, the variable indicating the person’s age is defined as a vector of dummy 
variables indicating if the person is 0-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, or 55-64 years old. Similarly, the variable 
measuring educational attainment is a vector of dummy variables indicating if the person is a high school dropout 
(less than 12 years), a high school graduate (12 years), has some college (13-15 years), or is a college graduate (at 
least 16 years). The educational attainment variable takes on the value of the education of the head of the household   15
at time t, as well as the unemployment rate interacted with the dummy variables in the 
immigration vector I. These interactions control for the possibility that immigrant outcomes are 
more sensitive to the business cycle than those of natives (as well as net out any potential 
correlation between the generosity variable, G, and the state unemployment rate).16 Because the 
generosity dummy variable is set to one for states that did not replace the lost federal benefits, 
the coefficient vector θ in equation (1) measures the impact of the federal cutbacks on the 
relative trend in immigrant health coverage. In particular, it measures the extent to which the 
pre- and post-PRWORA change in coverage differs between states that were less generous and 
states that were more generous. 
Table 4 reports the triple-difference coefficient vector θ estimated from a number of 
alternative specifications of the model. The specification reported in the first column of the table 
includes only the variables in the vector X, while the specification reported in the second column 
adds a vector of state fixed effects, and these fixed effects are interacted with both the time 
dummy variable (ti), as well as with the immigrant status vector (I). The state-time interactions 
capture not only state-specific differences in the level of health insurance, but also state-specific 
changes in health insurance coverage rates (induced perhaps by varying economic and political 
conditions). Similarly, the state-immigration status interactions net out the possibility that there 
may be state differences in health insurance coverage (and in the trends) across the various 
immigration status groups. Finally, the last two columns of Table 4 replicate the regression 
analysis in the sample of children. 
                                                                                                                                                             
for all persons who are less than 15 years old. The year of arrival dummy variables indicate if the household arrived 
after 1995, 1990-94, 1985-89, 1980-84, 1975-79, 1970-74, 1965-69, 1960-64, 1950-59, or before 1950. 
16 I also include all the possible interactions between the state’s unemployment rate, the period fixed effect, 
and the variables in the immigration vector I. These interactions allow for the impact of aggregate economic during 
the economic boom of the late 1990s to differ over time and across the various immigrant groups.   16
The top panel of the table estimates the impact of the state policies on the relative change 
in Medicaid enrollment. In the full-interaction specification, the triple-difference coefficient for 
non-citizens is -.049 (with a standard error of .025) in the sample of all persons, and -.105 (.048) 
in the children’s sample. The state policies, therefore, had a significant impact on Medicaid 
participation in the non-citizen population. In other words, non-citizens residing in states that did 
not offer state-funded assistance programs to their immigrant populations experienced a 
significant decline in their Medicaid participation rates, and the decline was particularly steep for 
non-citizen children. In contrast, these programs did not affect the relative Medicaid participation 
rate of citizens or of the children of citizens. 
The middle panel of the table estimates the regression using a different dependent 
variable, namely an indicator of whether the person has any type of health insurance coverage. 
To the extent that the Medicaid cutbacks generate a larger pool of uninsured non-citizens, one 
would expect the relevant coefficient in the vector θ to be negative and significant. However, this 
coefficient is positive. In particular, it takes on a value of .024 (.021) in the sample of all persons, 
and .022 (.031) in the sample of children. In other words, there is no evidence that the welfare 
cutbacks significantly reduced the aggregate health insurance coverage rate in the targeted group 
of non-citizens. In contrast, the health insurance coverage rate actually increased in the states 
that were the least generous and did not attempt to attenuate the presumed adverse impacts of 
PRWORA. 
Finally, the bottom panel helps to resolve the puzzle of declining Medicaid participation 
and stable (or increasing) health insurance coverage by showing how the state-funded assistance 
programs influenced the probability that immigrants were covered by employer-sponsored 
insurance. The coefficient for non-citizens in this regression is .101 (.026) in the sample of all   17
persons, and .147 (.049) in the sample of children.17 In other words, immigrants who lived in 
states that did not provide generous assistance programs to their immigrant populations after 
1996 became substantially more likely to be covered by employer-sponsored insurance.  This 
increase in ESI helped to greatly attenuate the potential adverse impact of the welfare cutbacks 
on the number of non-citizens who lack health insurance. In contrast, the probability that citizens 
are covered by ESI does not strongly depend on the provision of state-funded assistance (the 
coefficient is negative, but insignificant).18 
 
Sensitivity Tests 
An important step in the construction of the empirical framework is the classification of a 
state into the “more” and “less” generous categories. As noted above, states made many different 
decisions regarding their offers of state-funded assistance to immigrants in the post-welfare 
reform period. I have chosen a very simple classification to summarize all of these activities: did 
the state provide any “beyond-the-minimum” state-funded assistance to either its pre-enrollment 
or the post-enrollment immigrants during the five-year bar? 
It is important to examine if the results are sensitive to the definition of the variable 
describing the state’s generosity. Zimmermann and Tumlin (1999) construct an index of 
generosity for each state that uses much of the available information on the various state 
                                                 
17 For simplicity, I use the linear probability model to estimate equation (1). A probit specification yields 
similar results. For example, the marginal impact (at the mean) implied by the probit triple-difference coefficient for 
non-citizens is -.024 (.010) in the Medicaid regression; .016 (.013) in the health insurance coverage regression; and 
.099 (.022) in the ESI regression. The respective coefficients in the children’s sample are -.079 (.027), .012 (.018), 
and .150 (.042). 
18 More detailed estimates of the regression model (not shown) suggest that the various impacts of welfare 
reform (and state actions) capture a chilling effect rather than programmatic changes. In particular, I estimated the 
full-interaction regression model on the pooled sample of natives and immigrants who arrived before 1996. Since 
relatively few pre-enactment immigrants were affected by the cutbacks, any resulting effects are likely due to 
chilling effects. The coefficient is -.049 (.032) in the Medicaid regression; .030 (.018) in the health insurance   18
programs, including restrictions for various types of immigrants, immigrant eligibility for 
General Assistance programs, and the extent of deeming requirements. They classified states into 
four categories, ranking state-funded assistance from “most available” to “least available”. The 
third column of Table 2 reports the Zimmermann-Tumlin ranking. I construct an alternative 
dummy variable indicating the state’s generosity by setting the variable Gj to unity if the state 
was not generous in the Zimmermann-Tumlin sense; specifically, the state’s assistance was 
either “less available” or “least available.” By this definition, 32 states are classified as less 
generous.19 
The first two columns of Table 5 report the triple-difference coefficients from this 
specification of the model. As before, the evidence clearly indicates that non-citizens living in 
states that were not generous experienced a significant decline in Medicaid participation rates 
(the coefficient in the full-interaction model is -.043, with a standard error of .013), with the 
decline being particularly steep for children in non-citizen households. At the same time, neither 
the immigrants nor the children living in the less generous states experienced much of a drop in 
their health insurance coverage rate. The conflict between these two facts is resolved by the fact 
that non-citizens living in the less generous states experienced a substantial rise in the rate of ESI 
coverage.  
To further assess the sensitivity of the results to definitions of the state’s generosity, I 
also constructed an index based solely on the state’s provision of health insurance to immigrants, 
since this type of public assistance should presumably have the most direct impact on aggregate 
health insurance coverage rates. As noted earlier, practically all states (50 out of 51) extended 
                                                                                                                                                             
coverage regression; and .113 (.034) in the ESI regression. These coefficients are almost identical to those reported 
in Table 4.   19
Medicaid coverage to pre-enactment immigrants. Tumlin, Zimmermann and Ost (1999) report 
two particular types of programs that only some states made available to their immigrant 
populations. In particular, some states offered state-funded Medicaid to post-enactment 
immigrants during the five-year bar or to other “unqualified” immigrants.20 The last column of 
Table 2 reports whether the state provided either of these programs. I define a new generosity 
index by creating a dummy variable set to unity if the state did not offer Medicaid either to its 
post-enactment immigrants during the five-year bar or to other unqualified immigrants. By this 
definition, 13 states are classified as less generous.21 
The right panel of Table 5 summarizes the evidence. As before, non-citizens who live in 
the less generous states experienced a decline in Medicaid participation, with the decline being 
particularly steep for children. Despite the decline in Medicaid coverage, however, the non-
citizens most affected by these cutbacks did not experience a sizable drop in health insurance 
coverage, partly because of an increase in their rate of ESI coverage. The thrust of the evidence 
on health insurance coverage rates, therefore, is not sensitive to the definition of the generosity 
index. As a result, the remainder of the analysis will use my initial definition of the generosity 
index, which is based on the programmatic information summarized in the first two columns of 
Table 2. 
Regardless of the definition of the state’s generosity index, any comparison between 
naturalized citizens and non-citizens may be contaminated by the potential endogeneity of the 
naturalization decision. After all, the non-citizens most affected by welfare reform could 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 The weighted correlation coefficient between the generosity index derived from the Zimmermann-
Tumlin classification and the generosity index used in Table 4 is .67, where the weights are the number of 
observations in the state. 
20 “Unqualified immigrants” include illegal immigrants, asylum applicants, and temporary immigrants.   20
neutralize many of the restrictions in the legislation by becoming naturalized.22 In fact, there was 
a rapid rise in the number of naturalization applications during the period (Wasem, 1998). This 
increase in the number of naturalization applications generated a huge backlog at the INS, further 
delaying the time it takes to become a naturalized citizen. 
One solution to the endogeneity problem would be to compare persons who differ in 
terms of how long they have resided in the United States, rather than in terms of their citizenship 
status. Immigrants have to live in the United States for five years before they can apply for 
naturalization, but the lags in the application process imply that it may take 8 years or more 
before an immigrant can become a naturalized citizen. I estimated the triple-difference regression 
model using an immigrant vector defined in terms of whether the person was native-born, was an 
immigrant who had been in the United States for fewer than 10 years, or was an immigrant who 
had been in the United States for more than 10 years. These regressions (not shown) indicated 
that although the most recent immigrants suffered the greatest declines in Medicaid participation 
rates, their health insurance coverage rates remained relatively constant because of a concurrent 
increase in the rate of ESI coverage. Alternatively, the endogeneity of the naturalization decision 
can be avoided by simply comparing the immigrant and native populations, so that the vector I in 
equation (1) would contain a single variable indicating if the household is headed by a foreign-
born person. The evidence (not shown) suggested that Medicaid participation fell for immigrants, 
while health insurance coverage rates remained constant because of a corresponding increase in 
the probability of being covered by employer-sponsored insurance. 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 The weighted correlation coefficient between this generosity index and the index used in Table 4 is .33, 
where the weights are the number of observations in the state. 
22 If the non-citizens most likely to be adversely affected by the Medicaid cutbacks choose to naturalize, 
the non-citizen coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 would tend to understate the impact of the federal welfare 
cutbacks on Medicaid coverage rates.   21
In sum, the results presented in this section strongly suggest that the state-funded 
assistance programs helped to attenuate the decline in Medicaid participation in the immigrant 
population. At the same time, however, these state-funded programs (or their absence) had 
important “unintended” consequences. Non-citizens who did not have access to the state-funded 
programs found ways of replacing the cutbacks in publicly provided health insurance by 
increasing their probability of coverage with employer-sponsored insurance. In the end, the state-
funded programs did not seem to substantially alter the probability that the immigrants had some 
type of health insurance coverage. 
The evidence, therefore, implies the existence of a strong crowdout effect of publicly 
provided health insurance. The results effectively offer a “mirror-image” perspective to the 
crowdout findings first reported in Cutler and Gruber’s (1996) influential study. Cutler and 
Gruber document that an expansion of Medicaid eligibility substantially reduced the number of 
persons covered by private health insurance. My study reveals that a cutback in public assistance 
induces many immigrants to replace the lost benefits with employer-sponsored insurance. 
As noted earlier, however, the evidence presented in this paper differs in an important 
way from the results in the crowdout literature. The welfare reform legislation affected 
immigrant eligibility and participation in all public assistance programs. As a result, the 
crowdout effects estimated in this section capture the behavioral response to the changing value 
of the entire package of public benefits, rather than the behavioral response to a shift in the 
parameters of the Medicaid program. 
 
IV. Welfare Reform and Labor Supply 
  One key implication of the findings reported in the previous section is that the welfare 
reform legislation must have influenced the labor supply decisions of the targeted immigrants. I   22
now examine if such a labor supply effect can indeed be documented in the immigrant 
population. 
  I restrict my study of the labor supply decision to the sample of persons aged 18-64. I 
focus on three alternative measures of labor supply. The first indicates if the person is in the 
labor force during the survey week. The second gives the log of annual hours worked in the past 
calendar year (calculated only in the sample of workers). The third indicates if a person is 
working full-time, which is defined as working at least 35 hours per week (again, this variable is 
only calculated in the sample of workers). It is well known that relatively few part-time workers 
have access to ESI and other employee benefits.23 The study of full-time status can then provide 
an understanding of how workers respond to policy changes on a labor supply margin that has 
important implications for health insurance coverage. Finally, the analysis will be carried out 
separately for men and women. 
The top panel of Table 6 summarizes some of the key trends in labor supply before and 
after PRWORA, again classified according to the generosity of the state’s welfare offer to 
immigrants. Consider initially the trends in labor supply experienced by native men. The labor 
force participation rate of native men was stable over the 1994-2000 period in both the less and 
more generous states. In contrast, the labor force participation rate of immigrants increased 
slightly from 84.2 to 85.8 percent in the more generous states, but increased much faster (from 
83.1 to 86.9 percent) in the less generous states. Put differently, the labor supply of immigrant 
men seemed to be extremely responsive to the welfare cutbacks; immigrants living in states that 
did not provide state-funded assistance to replace the federal cutbacks were the ones who 
experienced the largest increase in labor force participation rates. Moreover, this increase in 
                                                 
23 In 2000, 65.3 percent of full-time workers were covered by ESI, as compared to only 19.1 percent of 
part-time workers.   23
labor supply occurred almost entirely among non-citizens. The labor force participation rate of 
naturalized citizens, for example, rose slightly from 83.7 to 84.3 percent in the more generous 
states, and was stable at 84.0 percent in the less generous states. In contrast, the labor force 
participation rate of non-citizens rose from 84.4 to 86.9 percent in the more generous states, but 
increased by 6 percentage points (from 82.5 to 88.5 percent) in the less generous states. The 
descriptive evidence, therefore, clearly indicates that the immigrant men who could have been 
most adversely affected by welfare reform substantially increased their labor supply. 
The other measures of male labor supply reported in Table 6 reinforce this pattern. For 
example, the annual hours of work of working native men changed by only 3 or 4 percent, 
regardless of where they lived. In contrast, the annual hours of work of non-citizen men rose by 
about 9 percent if they lived in the more generous states and by 13 percent if they lived in the 
less generous states. Interestingly, the behavioral labor supply response in the affected immigrant 
population included a sizable increase in the fraction of immigrant men who worked full-time. 
The fraction of native men who worked in full-time jobs was relatively stable over the period, 
increasing by only about 1 percentage point in both the more and less generous states. In 
contrast, the fraction of non-citizens who worked full-time jobs rose by 3.5 percentage points 
(from 88.0 to 91.5 percent) in the more generous states, but by 6.2 percentage points (from 84.8 
to 91.0 percent) in the less generous states. 
The trends in female labor supply are not as striking as those documented in the male 
sample. The data generally suggest that female immigrants living in the less generous states 
increased their labor supply relatively more, but the results are not very consistent. For example, 
the labor force participation rate of non-citizen women rose by about 3 percentage points 
regardless of the state where they lived. In contrast, annual hours of work of non-citizen women 
rose by 10 percent if they lived in the more generous states and by 14 percent if they lived in the   24
less generous states. The discrepancy between the labor supply trends of immigrant men and 
women may indicate the existence of spillover labor supply effects within families (since 
typically only one family member needs to be covered by ESI), as well as suggest the possibility 
that female labor force participation plays a different role in native and immigrant families, a 
proposition that has not been sufficiently analyzed in the existing literature.24 
To investigate the extent to which these labor supply trends can be explained by 
differences in socioeconomic characteristics among the groups or by state-specific trends in 
economic or social conditions, consider again the triple-difference regression model: 
 
(2)   hij = Xij β + α0 tij + α1 Iij + α2 Gj  
    + γ0 (Iij × tij) + γ1 (Iij × Gj) + γ2 (Gj × tij) + θ (Iij × Gj × tij) + εij , 
 
where hij is a variable measuring some aspect of labor supply for person i in state j. Note that the 
regression specification in (2) is identical to the one used in the previous section to quantify the 
impact of welfare reform on health insurance coverage rates. The coefficient θ, however, now 
measures the impact of the welfare cutbacks on the relative trend in immigrant labor supply.  
  Table 7 reports the relevant regression coefficients from various specifications of the 
model in equation (2). The estimated coefficients consistently show that the labor supply of non-
citizen men declined substantially in those states that were most generous with their immigrant 
populations in the aftermath of PRWORA, even after controlling for differences in a vast array 
of socioeconomic characteristics and state-specific factors. For example, the triple-difference 
coefficient measuring the impact of the welfare cutbacks on non-citizen male labor force 
                                                 
24 Baker and Benjamin (1997) and Duleep and Sanders (1993) provide some empirical evidence on the 
determinants of the labor supply decisions of immigrant women.   25
participation is .060 (with a standard error of .016); the coefficient measuring the impact on log 
annual hours worked is .041 (.058); and the coefficient measuring the impact on the probability 
that the worker works a full-time week is .040 (.022). In contrast, the triple-difference coefficient 
measuring the relative impact of the state programs on the labor supply of citizen men is 
numerically closer to zero and statistically insignificant. Finally, although the labor supply 
effects are (statistically) weaker for women, the estimated coefficients suggest that hours of work 
for non-citizen women increased more if they lived in states that were not generous to their 
immigrant populations in the aftermath of PRWORA. 
  In sum, the reduced-form results reported in Table 8 strongly imply that the state-funded 
assistance programs that were designed to attenuate the impact of welfare reform on immigrants 
played an important influence in the labor supply decisions of immigrants. 
 
V. The Crowdout Effect 
  The descriptive evidence summarized in the previous sections presents a strong 
circumstantial case supporting the hypothesis that public assistance alters the terms of trade 
between private health insurance and publicly provided health insurance. More precisely, I have 
shown that health insurance coverage rates did not decline among immigrants who potentially 
suffered the largest welfare cutbacks in the post-1996 period (i.e., non-citizens living in less 
generous states). Instead, this group experienced an offsetting increase in employer-sponsored 
insurance. I now examine the nature of this tradeoff. Consider the regression model: 
 
(3)   pij = Wij β + δ mij + ωij, 
   26
where pij is the probability that person i living in state j is covered by employer-sponsored 
insurance; Wij is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics defined below; and mij gives the 
probability that the person is covered by Medicaid. 
  Two related obstacles prevent a straightforward estimation of the structural model in 
equation (3). The first is that we do not observe the probability that a particular person receives 
Medicaid or is covered by ESI. Instead, we simply observe the outcome of these probability 
processes for a particular person. For example, the person is either covered by Medicaid or is 
not. This measurement problem can be easily addressed by changing the unit of analysis from a 
particular person to a particular group, defined as persons who share a particular immigration 
status, live in the same state, and are observed at the same point in time. I can then calculate the 
probability of receiving Medicaid and of being covered by employer-sponsored insurance for the 
“representative person” in each group, as well as calculate the mean of the various 
socioeconomic characteristics. 
Of course, the OLS estimate of the parameter δ would be biased even if the regression 
were estimated in these aggregate data. There is, after all, a spurious correlation between the 
receipt of Medicaid and ESI coverage. Medicaid eligibility depends on many characteristics, 
some of which are unobserved. Persons with favorable values of these characteristics (such as 
higher assets) will not qualify and participate in the Medicaid program. Many of these factors, 
however, are correlated with the probability that the person works and is covered by ESI. An 
observed negative correlation between p and m, therefore, does not capture the behavioral 
tradeoff between publicly and privately provided insurance, but is instead contaminated by the 
correlation between the probability of receiving Medicaid and the error term in equation (3). 
The structural parameter δ can be correctly estimated by using instrumental variables, 
where the instruments are provided by the exogenous variation in eligibility rules introduced by   27
the immigrant provisions in the welfare reform legislation, as well as by the responses of 
individual states to the changes in the federal safety net. In particular, consider a first-stage 
regression model given by: 
 
(4)   mk = Xk β + λ Zk + vk , 
 
where the subscript k denotes a particular cell defined by year of observation (i.e., before or after 
1996), state of residence, immigration status (i.e., native, citizen, refugee and non-citizen, and 
non-refugee and non-citizen), and gender; and the vector Zk = (t, I, G, I × t, G × t, I × G, I × G × 
t). Note that Zk contains the same set of variables used in the reduced-form triple difference 
regression models estimated in the previous sections. 
The aggregate version of the second stage regression is obtained by aggregating equation 
(3) within each cell k. It can be written as: 
 
(3′)   pk = Wk β + δ mk + ωk, 
 
The vector Wk in the second stage regression in equation (3′) is given by Wk = [Xk, Z ~
k], where Z ~
k 
= (t, I, G, I × t, G × t, I × G). The identification of the structural coefficient δ depends entirely on 
the exclusion of the triple-difference interaction terms from the second-stage regression. The 
vector X contains the within-cell mean of the set of socioeconomic characteristics used in the 
regressions in the previous sections. In addition, the regression includes a vector of state fixed 
effects, and interacts this vector with both the immigration status variables and with the dummy 
variable indicating if the observation refers to the post-1996 period. Finally, the standard errors 
are clustered by state-immigration status cells to adjust for possible serial correlation.    28
  The first column of Table 8 reports the estimated structural coefficient when the 
dependent variable in the second-stage equation is the probability that the typical person in cell k 
is covered by employer-sponsored insurance. As the first row shows, there is a sizable negative 
correlation between the probability of receiving Medicaid and the probability of being covered 
by ESI. The coefficient is numerically large and marginally significant from zero (-1.79, with a 
standard error of .94). Moreover, this coefficient is not significantly different from one. The IV 
estimate of δ, therefore, confirms the key insight from the descriptive statistics presented in the 
previous sections: the availability of Medicaid seems to completely crowd out the presence of 
employer-sponsored insurance in the sample of disadvantaged immigrants most affected by 
welfare reform. 
The second column of the table estimates the second-stage regression using an alternative 
dependent variable, the probability that the typical person in cell k has some type of health 
insurance coverage. This coefficient is numerically close to zero and statistically insignificant 
(the coefficient is -.25, with a standard error of .60). The results, therefore, indicate that a 
cutback in the probability of receiving Medicaid generates a completely offsetting increase in the 
probability that a person is covered by employer-sponsored insurance, thereby leaving 
unchanged the probability that the person has some type of health insurance coverage.  
The remaining rows of Table 8 re-estimate the regression models using alternative 
definitions for the vector I. As noted earlier, the citizenship status of a person may be partly 
endogenous, as many immigrants become naturalized citizens to escape the impact of the 
PRWORA cutbacks. One simple solution to this problem is to use the immigrant’s year of arrival 
in the United State to define the various groups. In the second row, the dummy variables in the 
vector I indicate if a person is native, has lived in the United States for more than 10 years, has 
lived in the United States for fewer than 10 years, or is a refugee. The coefficient δ reported in   29
the first column is -1.01 (.87). Moreover, note that the coefficient is .28 (.74) in the second 
column, where the dependent variable is the probability of being covered by some type of health 
insurance. Therefore, there seems to be a negative structural relation between the probability of 
receiving Medicaid and the probability of having some type of health insurance coverage, again 
suggesting a strong crowdout effect. 
Finally, row 3 of Table 8 estimates the regression model using only the information on 
whether a person is native-born, refugee, or non-refugee to define the variables in the vector I. 
Although the coefficients now have larger standard errors, the point estimates are consistent with 
the overall story. The impact of the probability of receiving Medicaid on the probability of being 
covered by employer-sponsored insurance is -1.35 (1.33), while the impact of Medicaid on the 
probability of being covered by some type of health insurance coverage is .11 (.87). 
The bottom panel of the table reports the IV coefficients from the regressions estimated 
in the sample of children.25 These coefficients tend to be quite similar to those reported in the 
sample of all persons. For example, the two coefficients in the specification presented in row 1, 
where the vector I uses information on the citizenship status of the head of the household to 
classify the children in the household, are -.98 (.98) in the ESI coverage regression and .12 (.73) 
in the health insurance coverage regression. The evidence, therefore, suggests a crowdout effect 
of Medicaid on privately provided insurance among the children of the targeted immigrants. 
Before concluding, it is worth emphasizing that there is an important conceptual 
difference between the estimates of the crowdout effect reported in this paper and those reported 
in the existing literature. The welfare reform legislation changed the eligibility rules for 
                                                 
25 To avoid having many cells in the children sample that have a small number of observations, the 
construction of the cells does not differentiate between the two gender groups. A cell is then defined by immigration 
status, state of residence, and time period. I control for gender by including a variable indicating the fraction of the 
observations in the cell that are boys as a regressor in the first- and second-stage models.   30
immigrants in many public assistance programs. As a result, this study addresses a question that 
is related to, but different from, the question usually addressed in the crowdout literature. In 
particular, existing studies attempt to determine if increased availability of publicly provided 
health insurance encourages persons to leave the private insurance system and enroll in 
Medicaid. In contrast, my analysis examines if generalized cutbacks in public assistance 
encourage individuals to alter their behavior along many margins, particularly labor supply. My 
evidence indicates that the net outcome of all of these responses is a substantial increase in the 
probability that individuals are covered by employer-sponsored health insurance. It should not 
then be surprising that my estimates of the crowdout effect are larger than the estimates found in 
the existing literature. 
Although it would be of great interest to isolate the contribution of the cutbacks in the 
various public assistance programs to the estimated crowdout effect, such an analysis is 
empirically difficult because there is a great deal of “jointness” in program participation: 94.0 
percent of persons who receive cash benefits and 67.1 percent of those who receive food stamps 
are also enrolled in Medicaid. As a result, it is unlikely that the immigrant restrictions in 
PRWORA can help identify the separate effects. 
 
VI. Summary 
The 1996 welfare reform legislation contained a number of provisions that greatly limited 
the eligibility of many immigrants (particularly non-citizens and non-refugees) to receive many 
types of public assistance. In response to the federal legislation, many states chose to protect 
their immigrant populations from the presumed adverse impact of PRWORA by offering state-
funded assistance to these groups.   31
I use data drawn from the 1995-2001 Annual Demographic Supplements of the Current 
Population Surveys to examine the relation between the immigrant-related provisions in 
PRWORA—as modified by the subsequent state responses—and health insurance coverage in 
the immigrant population. In the absence of any behavioral response, one would have expected 
that health insurance coverage rates would have been sharply curtailed in the population most 
adversely affected by the restrictions, the non-citizens living in states that did not offer state-
funded assistance to their immigrant populations. In other words, as the Medicaid cutbacks took 
effect, the proportion of those immigrants covered by some type of health insurance should have 
declined. 
The empirical analysis indeed indicates that the targeted immigrant population 
experienced a decline in Medicaid coverage as the PRWORA provisions took effect. However, 
the analysis also reveals that the expected decline in health insurance coverage rates did not 
materialize. If anything, health insurance coverage rates actually rose slightly in this group. 
The resolution to this conflicting evidence lies in the fact that the affected immigrants 
responded to the welfare cutbacks. The immigrants most likely to be adversely affected by the 
new restrictions significantly increased their labor supply, thereby raising their probability of 
being covered by employer-sponsored insurance. In fact, this increase in the probability of 
coverage through employer-sponsored insurance was large enough to completely offset the 
Medicaid cutbacks. The empirical analysis, therefore, provides strong evidence of a sizable 
crowdout effect of publicly provided health insurance among immigrants. In an important sense, 
the state programs were unnecessary. In the absence of these programs, the targeted immigrants 
themselves would have taken actions to reduce the probability that they would be left without 
health insurance coverage. 
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Table 1. Trends in Welfare Participation and Health Insurance Coverage, 1994-2000 
 
  Calendar Year 
Percent of persons: 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Receiving  Medicaid           
Natives  11.8  11.9 11.6  10.6 10.0  9.9  9.9 
Immigrants  17.0  16.5 14.7  13.4 13.1 13.0 13.4 
Naturalized  citizens 7.8  9.3 9.7  9.6 9.8 9.1 9.9 
Non-citizens  21.3  20.3 17.8  15.9 15.2 15.6 15.8 
           
With  health  insurance           
Natives  85.1  85.0 84.9  84.4 84.3 85.3 87.0 
Immigrants  67.0  67.4 66.4  65.6 65.2 66.3 68.8 
Naturalized  citizens    79.4  78.8 76.7  76.5 75.1 75.8 79.2 
Non-citizens  61.1  61.7 60.1  58.5 58.8 59.8 61.5 
           
With employer-sponsored 
insurance 
         
Natives  66.9  67.2 67.6  67.7 68.6 69.6 71.2 
Immigrants  45.8  47.3 47.5  48.3 47.7 48.8 51.6 
Naturalized  citizens 63.6  63.9 61.1  61.1 59.7 59.6 63.0 
Non-citizens  37.3  38.8 39.3  39.9 39.9 41.4 43.6 
 
Source: All statistics are calculated from the 1995-2001 March Current Population Surveys. 
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Food assistance or SSI 
to pre-enactment 
immigrants 
TANF, Medicaid, food 
assistance, or SSI to post-
enactment immigrants 
during five-year bar 
Zimmermann-Tumlin 





during five-year bar 
Alabama  No  No Least available  No
Alaska  No  No Less available  Yes
Arizona  No  No Less available  No
Arkansas  No  No Least available  Yes
California Yes Yes Most  available  Yes
Colorado  No Yes Less  available  Yes
Connecticut Yes  Yes Somewhat  available  Yes
Delaware  No Yes Less  available  Yes
District of Columbia  No  No Less available  No
Florida Yes  No Somewhat available  Yes
Georgia  No Yes Less  available  Yes
Hawaii  No Yes Somewhat  available  Yes
Idaho   No  No Least available  No
Illinois Yes  Yes Most  available  Yes
Indiana   No  No Least available  No
Iowa   No  No Less available  Yes
Kansas   No  No Less available  Yes
Kentucky  No  No Less available  Yes
Louisiana  No  No Least available  Yes
Maine   Yes  Yes Most available  Yes
Maryland Yes Yes Most  available  Yes
Massachusetts Yes  Yes Most  available  Yes
Michigan  No  No Less available  Yes
Minnesota Yes  Yes Somewhat  available  Yes
Mississippi  No  No Least available  Yes
Missouri Yes  Yes Most  available  Yes
Montana   No  No Less available  Yes
Nebraska Yes Yes Most  available  Yes
Nevada   No  No Less available  Yes
New Hampshire Yes  No Less available  Yes
New Jersey Yes  No Somewhat available  Yes
New Mexico  No  No Less available  No
New York Yes  No Somewhat available  Yes
North Carolina  No  No Less available  Yes
North Dakota  No  No Less available Yes
Ohio   Yes  No Least available  Yes
Oklahoma  No  No Least available  No
Oregon   Yes  Yes Somewhat available  No
Pennsylvania  No Yes Somewhat  available  Yes
Rhode Island  Yes  Yes Most available  Yes
South Carolina  No  No Least available  No
South Dakota  No  No Least available  No
Tennessee  No Yes Less  available  Yes
Texas   Yes  No Least available  No
Utah  No Yes Less  available  Yes
Vermont   No Yes Somewhat  available  Yes
Virginia  No Yes Less  available  Yes
Washington Yes  Yes Most  available  Yes
West Virginia  No  No Least available  No
Wisconsin Yes  Yes Somewhat  available  Yes
Wyoming  No Yes Less  available  No
 
Source: Tumlin, Zimmermann and Ost (1999) and Zimmermann and Tumlin (1999).   37
Table 3. Trends in Health Insurance Coverage 
 
  All persons    Children 
























Covered by Medicaid               
Natives  11.6  9.9 12.6  9.9   21.0  18.2 22.8 19.5 
Immigrants  16.9  13.5 15.3 10.4   29.5  25.7 27.0 20.9 
Naturalized  citizens  8.4  9.7 10.6  9.1   14.9  17.5 18.7 18.4 
Non-citizens  21.0  16.1 18.1 11.1   35.4  30.9 31.1 22.2 
Non-citizen, non-
refugee 
18.9  15.8 17.3 10.3   33.0  30.5 29.9 20.3 
                
Covered by health insurance             
Natives  85.5  86.1 83.8 83.9   88.6  89.3 86.4 87.3 
Immigrants  67.2  66.9 67.2 66.1   73.5  73.4 69.6 70.2 
Naturalized  citizens  78.9  77.0 80.4 75.0   81.8  80.7 82.5 79.5 
Non-citizens  61.6  59.9 59.0 61.1   70.1  68.8 63.3 65.7 
Non-citizen, non-
refugee 
59.7  58.7 57.5 59.5   68.5  67.8 62.1 63.8 
               
Covered by employer-sponsored insurance            
Natives  68.0  70.6 64.8 67.8   65.3  69.0 61.4 65.8 
Immigrants  46.5  49.2 47.0 51.7   43.6  46.2 42.0 49.7 
Naturalized  citizens  63.8  61.1 63.8 58.7   63.3  60.5 61.3 59.7 
Non-citizens  38.2  40.9 36.5 47.9   35.5  37.1 32.6 44.9 
Non-citizen, non-
refugee 
38.4  40.2 35.1 46.4   36.0  36.4 31.9 43.4 
 
Notes: The pre-1996 statistics are calculated from the pooled 1995 and 1996 March Current Population Surveys; the 
post-1996 statistics are calculated from the pooled 1999, 2000, and 2001 March Current Population Surveys. 
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Table 4. Impact of Welfare Reform on Health Insurance Coverage,  
Triple Difference Estimates 
 
  All persons  Children 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Covered by Medicaid           
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  -.006  .004    .004  .020 
 (.015)  (.014)    (.030)  (.028) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  -.049  -.043    -.105  -.100 
 (.025)  (.025)    (.048)  (.049) 
          
Covered by health insurance           
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  -.035  -.030    -.034  -.038 
 (.028)  (.024)    (.044)  (.038) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  .038  .024    .026  .022 
 (.024)  (.021)    (.034)  (.031) 
          
Covered by employer-sponsored insurance           
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  -.055  -.056    -.039  -.064 
 (.056)  (.049)    (.081)  (.063) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  .109  .101    .150  .147 
 (.035)  (.026)    (.057)  (.049) 
          
Controls for state fixed effects, with 
interactions 
No Yes  No Yes 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by state-immigration status groups. The “All 
persons” sample has 593,763 observations; the “children” sample has 194,422 observations. All regressions control 
for the age, race, gender, and educational attainment of the household head; the total number of persons, children, 
elderly persons, and disabled persons in the household; a vector of dummy variables indicating the household’s year 
of arrival in the United States (if immigrant); a dummy variable indicating if the household head is a refugee; the 
state’s unemployment rate in the particular survey year; and all interactions between the unemployment rate, the 
period fixed effect, and the vector of dummy variables indicating the person’s immigration status (i.e., native, 
citizen, or non-citizen). The “state fixed effects, with interactions” include a vector of state fixed effects interacted 
with the dummy variable indicating if the observation was drawn from the post-1996 period. The state fixed effects 
are also interacted with the dummy variables that indicate the person’s immigration status.    39
Table 5. Sensitivity of Results to Definition of State Generosity, 






Dependent variable: All Children All Children 
Covered by Medicaid           
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  -.016  -.031    -.004  -.029 
 (.010)  (.019)    (.008)  (.015) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  -.043  -.097    -.026  -.052 
 (.013)  (.025)    (.013)  (.023) 
          
Covered by health insurance           
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  -.002  .018    .044  .070 
 (.021)  (.034)    (.015)  (.017) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  .006  -.029    .007  -.022 
 (.014)  (.025)    (.013)  (.026) 
          
Covered by employer-sponsored insurance           
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  .007  .043    .036  .061 
 (.032)  (.045)    (.023)  (.032) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  .058  .077    .047  .045 
 (.020)  (.034)    (.018)  (.026) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by state-immigration status groups. The “all 
persons” sample has 593,763 observations; the “children” sample has 194,422 observations. All regressions control 
for the age, race, gender, and educational attainment of the household head; the total number of persons, children, 
elderly persons, and disabled persons in the household; a vector of dummy variables indicating the household’s year 
of arrival in the United States (if immigrant); a dummy variable indicating if the household head is a refugee; the 
state’s unemployment rate in the particular survey year; and all interactions between the unemployment rate, the 
period fixed effect, and the vector of dummy variables indicating the person’s immigration status (i.e., native, 
citizen, or non-citizen). The “state fixed effects, with interactions” include a vector of state fixed effects interacted 
with the dummy variable indicating if the observation was drawn from the post-1996 period. The state fixed effects 
are also interacted with the dummy variables that indicate the person’s immigration status.    40
Table 6. Trends in Labor Supply 
(Percent of households receiving assistance) 
 
  Men   Women 
























Labor force participation rate             
Natives  85.2  84.9 83.6 83.5   72.6  74.6 71.1 72.3 
Immigrants  84.2  85.8 83.1 86.9   60.4  63.0 58.5 61.5 
Naturalized  citizens  83.7  84.3 84.0 84.0   67.7  67.2 62.8 66.3 
Non-citizens  84.4  86.9 82.5 88.5   56.2  59.6 55.1 58.2 
Non-citizen, non-
refugee 
85.9  87.2 85.1 88.5   57.2  59.7 54.6 57.5 
               
Log of annual hours worked            
Natives  7.489  7.536 7.501 7.531  7.211  7.269 7.192 7.271 
Immigrants  7.429  7.504 7.415 7.503  7.170  7.262 7.072 7.186 
Naturalized  citizens  7.468  7.517 7.494 7.518  7.217  7.295 7.140 7.231 
Non-citizens  7.408  7.496 7.362 7.496  7.137  7.232 7.009 7.149 
Non-citizen, non-
refugee 
7.412  7.499 7.363 7.489  7.135  7.227 7.005 7.135 
               
Percent working full time               
Natives  89.1  90.5 90.0 90.8   71.9  74.5 72.8 75.9 
Immigrants  88.3  91.2 85.8 91.0   73.9  77.5 70.7 76.4 
Naturalized  citizens  89.1  90.6 87.3 91.0   72.5  77.7 69.2 75.7 
Non-citizens  88.0  91.5 84.8 91.0   74.9  77.4 72.0 76.9 
Non-citizen, non-
refugee 
88.1  91.8 84.8 90.7   74.7  77.7 71.1 76.3 
 
Notes: The pre-1996 statistics are calculated from the pooled 1995 and 1996 March Current Population Surveys; the 
post-1996 statistics are calculated from the pooled 1999, 2000, and 2001 March Current Population Surveys. 
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Table 7. Impact of Welfare Reform on Labor Supply,  
Triple Difference Estimates 
 
  Men   Women 
Sample: (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Labor  force  participation        
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  -.030  -.024    .016  .007 
 (.029)  (.026)    (.031)  (.032) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  .048  .060    .004  .006 
 (.018)  (.016)    (.026)  (.023) 
          
Log annual hours worked           
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  .003  -.007    .048  .068 
 (.059)  (.058)    (.071)  (.071) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  .062  .041    .070  .092 
 (.066)  (.058)    (.092)  (.103) 
          
Worked full time           
1. Naturalized citizens relative to natives  .033  .028    .037  .035 
 (.019)  (.015)    (.048)  (.048) 
2. Non-citizens relative to natives  .042  .040    .036  .034 
 (.028)  (.022)    (.026)  (.032) 
          
Controls for state fixed effects, with 
interactions 
No Yes    No Yes 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by state-immigration status groups. There are 
196,859 observations in the male regressions estimated in the top two panels; and 174,431 observations in the male 
regressions estimated in the bottom two panels. There are 210,684 observations in the female regressions estimated 
in the top two panels; and 159,163 observations in the female regressions estimated in the bottom two panels. All 
regressions control for the age, race, gender, and educational attainment of the household head; the total number of 
persons, children, elderly persons, and disabled persons in the household; a vector of dummy variables indicating the 
household’s year of arrival in the United States (if immigrant); a dummy variable indicating if the household head is 
a refugee; the state’s unemployment rate in the particular survey year; and all interactions between the 
unemployment rate, the period fixed effect, and the vector of dummy variables indicating the person’s immigration 
status (i.e., native, citizen, or non-citizen). The “state fixed effects, with interactions” include a vector of state fixed 
effects interacted with the dummy variable indicating if the observation was drawn from the post-1996 period. The 
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Table 8. Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Crowdout Effect, Full Interaction Model 
(Impact of probability of receiving Medicaid) 
 
  Dependent variable 
  Probability that person 
has employer-sponsored 
insurance 
Probability that person has 
some type of health 
insurance 
All persons       
Using citizenship status  -1.791  -.246 
 (.939)  (.597) 
Using year of arrival  -1.014  .279 
 (.868)  (.737) 
Using only immigration status  -1.353  .109 
 (1.332)  (.869) 
    
Children    
Using citizenship status  -.977  .124 
 (.984)  (.727) 
Using year of arrival  -.768  -.071 
 (.897)  (.649) 
Using only immigration status  -1.003  .136 
 (1.283)  (.971) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by state-immigration status groups. In the “all 
persons” sample, the regressions reported in rows 1 and 2 have 784 observations, while the regressions reported in 
row 3 have 600 observations. In the children sample, the regressions reported in rows 1 and 2 have 377 
observations, while the regressions reported in row 3 have 289 observations. All regressions control for the age, 
race, gender, and educational attainment of the household head; the total number of persons, children, elderly 
persons, and disabled persons in the household; a vector of dummy variables indicating the household’s year of 
arrival in the United States (if immigrant); a dummy variable indicating if the household head is a refugee; the 
state’s unemployment rate in the particular survey year; and all interactions between the unemployment rate, the 
period fixed effect, and the vector of dummy variables indicating the person’s immigration status (i.e., native, 
citizen, or non-citizen). The regressions also include a vector of state fixed effects interacted with the dummy 
variable indicating if the observation was drawn from the post-1996 period. The state fixed effects are also 
interacted with the dummy variables that indicate the person’s immigration status classification. All regressions are 
weighted by the sample size of the cell.  
 
 